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The Facts about Truthmaking: 
An Argument for Truthmaker 
Necessitarianism
J A m i N  A s Ay
The University of Hong Kong
Truthmaker necessitarianism is the view that an object is a truthmaker for a truth- 
bearer only if it is impossible for the object to exist and the truth- bearer be false. 
While this thesis is widely regarded as truthmaking “orthodoxy”, it is rarely explicit-
ly defended. in this paper i offer an argument in favor of necessitarianism that raises 
the question of what the truthmakers are for the truths about truthmaking. The sup-
posed advantages of non- necessitarianism dissolve once we take these truths into 
account.
Truthmaker theory is notorious for relying on strong metaphysical principles for which it often doesn’t have an argument. “i do not have any direct argu-
ment,” David Armstrong says of the case for his central thesis that all truths have 
truthmakers (2004: 7; cf. Bigelow 1988: 123). Likewise, little argument is given for 
another key thesis about truthmaking: necessitarianism. Necessitarianism states 
that an object is a truthmaker for a claim only if it is metaphysically impossible 
for that object to exist, and yet the claim be false. several writers have declared 
that necessitarianism is now “orthodoxy” in the truthmaking literature.1 There 
is, however, dissent to be found.2 my goal is to provide the orthodoxy with an 
actual argument.
Necessitarianism states a necessary condition on truthmaking, a condition 
which may or may not hold regardless of what else (if anything) one takes to be 
involved in truthmaking. Truthmaking, for example, may be a form of essen-
tial dependence (Lowe 2007), grounding (schaffer 2010), or taken as primitive 
(Rodriguez- Pereyra 2005); for each view the question arises as to whether or not 
1. E.g., merricks (2007: 5), Cameron (2008: 107), schaffer (2008: 10), and Goff (2010).
2. E.g., Parsons (1999), Heil (2000), mellor (2003), schaffer (2010), and Briggs (2012); Griffith 
(2015) rejects necessitarianism only for negative truths.
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truthmaking requires necessitating truthmakers. The appeal of necessitarianism 
is easy to appreciate. A truthmaker is supposed to account for, ground, or in 
some sense explain a truth- bearer’s truth. suppose some object T is offered as a 
candidate truthmaker for some truth <p>, but also that T’s existence is consistent 
with <p> being false. That is to say, given T’s existence, <p> may be true, or it 
may be false. in those cases where <p> is true, something else must be around to 
separate the situation from those where <p> is false. That something else, then, is 
highly relevant to the account of why <p> is true, and so deserves to figure into 
the truthmaker for <p>. Armstrong offers a defense of necessitarianism along 
these lines (2004: 6- 7; see also Bigelow 1988: 126), though it is not particularly 
compelling to his critics (e.g., Briggs 2012: 22). i happen to find his reasoning 
sound, but am interested in offering a new line of argument for his conclusion.
my argument revolves around the facts (i.e., true propositions) about truth-
making itself. suppose T is a truthmaker for <p>. if so, <p> is true, and so too is 
the truthmaking proposition <T makes true <p>>. my focus is on the grounds for 
these facts about truthmaking. According to necessitarians (e.g., Armstrong 2004: 
9), the members of the truthmaking relation suffice for making true the proposi-
tions about truthmaking. (This view, strictly speaking, isn’t logically forced onto 
necessitarians; rather, it’s a simple and straightforward view that is available 
to them.) in other words, if T makes true <p>, then T and <p> together (or their 
mereological sum) make true <T makes true <p>>. No additional ontological re-
sources are needed to make true the truthmaking fact; that T’s existence guaran-
tees the truth of <p> is necessary, and so necessitarians have a principled basis 
for concluding that T and <p> together are sufficient for grounding <T makes 
true <p>>. if something about the natures of T and <p> demonstrates that the for-
mer is a truthmaker for the latter, then these things are themselves appropriate 
grounds for the facts about what they make true. (in fact, if truth- bearers are nec-
essary existents, then T itself might be thought sufficient to do the truthmaking 
for not only <p>, but all the facts about what T makes true as well.) Hence, neces-
sitarians have a straightforward and principled account of the truthmakers for 
the facts about truthmaking that introduces no further ontological requirements.
What can non- necessitarians say about truthmaking facts? Consider a case 
where T is a truthmaker for <p>, but T does not necessitate <p>. That means that 
it’s possible for T to exist and <p> fail to be true. Hence the material conditional 
<if T exists, then T makes true <p>> is only contingently true. This is the sense in 
which i shall loosely speak of the truthmaking fact <T makes true <p>> being 
contingent. it’s possible that T could have existed and yet not made <p> true. so 
at least some truthmaking facts for non- necessitarians are contingent— that is 
to say, they remain contingent even after T’s existence is assumed. (Presumably 
some are necessary, even for non- necessitarians: <Kripke makes true <Kripke 
exists>> is necessary in the sense that if Kripke exists, then he must make true 
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<Kripke exists>.) The question now arises for non- necessitarians as to what, if 
anything, makes contingent truthmaking facts true. i consider each available 
answer in turn. my conclusion is that non- necessitarians have no good option 
when it comes to the accounting of contingent truthmaking propositions. Ne-
cessitarians and their simple, straightforward account thus enjoy a significant 
theoretical advantage.
The first possibility is that nothing makes such facts true: they are truthmaker 
gaps. The tenability of this position depends on one’s wider views about truth-
making. For maximalists, who believe that all truths have truthmakers, this view 
is a non- starter. For non- maximalists, truthmaker gaps still must be handled 
with care. One option is to treat such truths as being metaphysically brute: it’s 
true that T makes true <p>, but there is no further accounting to be had of such a 
truth. This response is rather extreme, and out of the basic spirit of truthmaker 
theory. The maneuver has precedents— see sorenson (2001) on the truth- teller— 
but it tends to be a view of last resort (and in sorenson’s case, a view only to be 
taken when we have no idea of the truth- value of the proposition in question and 
its negation). Truthmaker theory inherits its plausibility from the idea that truth 
is not a brute feature of the world: the alethic facts (i.e., the facts about the truth- 
values of truth- bearers) are dependent upon non- alethic matters. That claims 
about truthmaking should fail to live up to the spirit of truthmaking would be an 
unfortunate and ironic consequence for non- necessitarians. At the very least, ne-
cessitarians enjoy a significant advantage over this ‘brutalist’ position by not re-
quiring the infinitely many facts about truthmaking to be metaphysical bedrock.
There are gentler ways of handling truthmaker gaps. Rather than treating 
them as brute, one might argue that the nature of the truths in question reveals 
that they don’t need a truthmaker. This perspective is taken by those who be-
lieve that negative existentials do not require truthmakers (e.g., Bigelow 1988). 
According to this outlook, for <Leprechauns don’t exist> to be true, there doesn’t 
need to be some other kind of thing in existence. The truth concerns what doesn’t 
exist, not what does, and so requires no truthmaker to be true. This stance is 
controversial, but it’s not some simple ad hoc rejection of maximalism. Further-
more, there is no slippery slope from some truths not needing truthmakers to all 
truths not needing truthmakers. it doesn’t follow from <Leprechauns don’t ex-
ist> needing no truthmaker that <The mascot of Notre Dame is the leprechaun> 
doesn’t need one either. The relevant question for the non- necessitarian consid-
ering non- maximalism about truthmaking facts is whether they are relevantly 
analogous to facts about what doesn’t exist. And it appears not. The claim that 
T makes true <p> is a positive claim about the ‘alethic structure’ of the world. it 
posits a contingently existing dependence between T and the truth of <p>. As a 
result, i see no headway to be made on the view that contingent truthmaking 
facts are plausible truthmaker gaps.
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it seems, then, that non- necessitarians need to find truthmakers for the facts 
about truthmaking. Reserve ‘U’ for the name of the truthmaker for <T makes 
true <p>>, the proposition which i’ll now call ‘<q>’. so we have another truth-
making fact (‘<r>’) on our hands: <U makes true <q>>. (its truthmaker will be-
come relevant below.) U either necessitates <q> or it doesn’t. (Both options are 
available to non- necessitarians.) suppose it does. in that case, U’s existence guar-
antees that T makes true <p>. Hence, U’s existence also guarantees T’s existence, 
plus the truth of <p>. Because U and T are not identical (if they were, T would 
necessitate <p>), this view imposes the cost of forcing a necessary connection 
between distinct individuals: U can’t exist unless T does as well. Furthermore, 
given that U does guarantee the truth of <p> (and T doesn’t), it’s unclear why 
the non- necessitarian doesn’t just cite U in the first place as the truthmaker for 
<p>, and thereby concede necessitarianism. (This point echoes Armstrong’s ar-
gument above.) Presumably, the non- necessitarian sought the advantage of only 
needing T— and not U, something over and above it— in order to account for <p>. 
But on the current view of truthmaking facts, U makes its appearance anyway to 
account for what makes it true that T makes true <p>. The supposed gains in on-
tological economy that non- necessitarians can boast with respect to ‘first- order’ 
truths evaporate as soon as we seek out truthmakers for ‘second- order’ truths 
about what the truthmakers are for those first- order truths.
We come now to the view that contingent truthmaking facts do have truth-
makers, but non- necessitating ones. On this view, <U makes true <q>> is contin-
gent, just like <q> is. One question that immediately arises is what makes this 
third truth (a ‘third- order’ claim) true. The arguments above can be recycled 
again, and so the non- necessitarian will need to posit some non- necessitating 
truthmaker V for <r>. We are well on the way to an infinite regress here of more 
and more contingent truthmakers for higher- and higher- order truthmaking 
claims. Once we open the door to non- necessitating truthmakers, we appear to 
need infinitely many of them.
Given that necessitarians need only the original truthmaker in question, this 
regress is a significant cost, to put it mildly, for their opponents. First, there is the 
straightforward ontological cost of accepting U, V, W, and the rest. These onto-
logical commitments are bypassed by the necessitarian, who thus earns a leaner 
ontology. second, there is the fact that non- necessitarians end up committed to 
not just a larger ontology, but an infinitely large ontology, and simply in virtue of 
their view about the truthmaking relation. This is a startling metaphysical con-
sequence, one which would need far greater theoretical support than what one 
could extract merely from thinking about the truthmaking relation. in develop-
ing their overall ontological view, truthmaker theorists seek to develop the most 
theoretically economical ontology that can be employed to ground all the truths. 
By putting one truthmaker (rather than infinitely many) to work as the grounds 
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for infinitely many truths, necessitarians secure an important advantage over 
their opponents.
Here is another troubling consequence of the regress (this one courtesy 
of an anonymous referee). Higher- order truthmaking facts entail lower- order 
truthmaking facts. <U makes true <T makes true <p>>> entails <T makes true 
<p>>, which entails <p>. suppose an entailment principle is true, such that any 
truthmaker for a proposition is a truthmaker for any proposition entailed by the 
original proposition. in that case, all the infinitely many distinct truthmakers for 
the higher- order truthmaking facts are also truthmakers for the ground- level 
facts. Put succinctly: if <p> has T for a non- necessitating truthmaker, then it has 
infinitely many other distinct, non- necessitating truthmakers (U, V, W, etc.). To 
have one truthmaker is to have infinitely many.
The basic regress argument, then, shows that non- necessitarians require an 
infinite ontology to ground all of the infinitely many truthmaking facts associat-
ed with every single ground- level fact. When the regress is paired with an entail-
ment principle, we see that a single ground- level truth, all on its own, generates 
an infinitely large ontology of truthmakers. Of course, entailment principles are 
controversial, and not everyone accepts them (e.g., Rodriguez- Pereyra 2006). But 
it’s worth noting that the major source of skepticism about them doesn’t apply in 
this case. in cases of ‘non- relevant’ entailment, such as holds between <socrates 
exists> and <7 + 5 = 12>, one might argue that truthmaking doesn’t travel with the 
entailment (see Armstrong 2004: 10- 12). But the case of entailment between <T 
makes true <p>> and <p> would seem to be secure under any model of relevance- 
based entailment. so any non- necessitarian who accepts even a weaker version 
of an entailment principle faces the problem.
There is one way for the non- necessitarian to stop the regress. Take T, U, V, 
and everything else up the chain to be one and the same. This view parallels the 
necessitarian’s view. For necessitarians, if T makes true <p> as a matter of neces-
sity, then it can also make true, as a matter of necessity, <T makes true <p>>, <T 
makes true <T makes true <p>>>, and all the others. (Recall again the caveat that 
perhaps the truth- bearers themselves will also figure into the higher- order truth-
making facts.) The non- necessitarian might claim similarly that because T makes 
true <p>, it also (perhaps in concert with <p>) makes true <T makes true <p>> and 
the others up the chain. T by itself doesn’t guarantee the truth of <q> or <r> any 
more than it guarantees the truth of <p>. But that of course is no objection to the 
non- necessitarian.
The problem here for the non- necessitarian is that this perspective doesn’t 
make sense in the context of contingent truthmaking facts. it makes perfect sense 
for necessitarians. When T is a (necessitating) truthmaker for <p>, it’s presumably 
something about the nature or essence of T and <p> that ties them together. Noth-
ing outside of the truthmaking relation is necessary to account for why the truth-
498 • Jamin Asay
Ergo • vol. 3, no. 18 • 2016
making relation holds. All the higher- order facts about truthmaking concern-
ing T and <p> immediately follow. But when it comes to the non- necessitarian’s 
contingent truthmaking facts, this perspective is unavailable. According to the 
non- necessitarian, T does make true <p>, but T itself is not responsible for this 
relationship; that’s the basic premise of the non- necessitarian’s view. sometimes 
T makes true <p>, sometimes it doesn’t. it’s nothing about T itself that makes the 
difference between the two cases— if the obtaining of the truthmaking in ques-
tion were due solely to T, then T would be a necessitating truthmaker. Hence, 
the basic commitment of the non- necessitarian is that something other than T is 
responsible for T’s making true <p>: U, V, and the rest cannot be identical to T. 
The non- necessitarian needs a distinct U that accounts for why T makes true <p>. 
And as before, if U itself is a necessitator, then all along it was the truthmaker 
for <p>, and if it’s not, then we’re back on the regress of infinitely many distinct 
individuals.
To solidify the argument, consider a particular example of the kind that 
tends to motivate the non- necessitarian view. Negative existentials and univer-
sal generalizations are the bugbears of necessitarian truthmaker theory. To find 
truthmakers for them, necessitarians are driven to suspiciously ad hoc ontologi-
cal posits such as absences (martin 1996) or totalities (Armstrong 2004). it’s true, 
for instance, that all official copies of the international kilogram prototype are lo-
cated in France. There are six such copies, and they all reside within the Pavillon 
de Breteuil in sèvres, just outside Paris. Label them ‘A’ through ‘F’. suppose we 
have a truthmaker for <A is an official copy of the international kilogram proto-
type and is located in France>; call it ‘TA’, and suppose the same for the rest of the 
copies. TA through TF collectively (or their mereological sum) make it true that 
each of the six official copies are in France. They do not, however, necessitate the 
truth of <All official copies of the international kilogram prototype are located in 
France>. The international Bureau of Weights and measures could have decided 
to make a lucky seventh copy after finishing A through F, and then shipped it off 
to Antarctica for safekeeping. in that case, the collection of TA through TF exists, 
though <All official copies of the international kilogram prototype are located in 
France> is false.
Necessitarians cannot cite TA through TF as the truthmaker for the general-
ization, because they don’t guarantee that A through F are the only instances of 
the generalization. Hence, the necessitarian has a need for there to be, in addi-
tion to TA through TF, an absence of other instances, or for A through F to figure 
into some totality of instances, or something similar. The non- necessitarian balks 
at this juncture, and claims that TA through TF are good enough to ground the 
truth of <All official copies of the international kilogram prototype are located in 
France>. For the generalization to be true, all the instances need to be true. There 
are six instances, and TA through TF take care of establishing their truth. so TA 
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through TF can serve as the truthmakers, albeit non- necessitating truthmakers, 
for the generalization. (see mellor 2003: 214 for a defense of this line.)
Now consider how my argument plays out for the non- necessitarian. What 
is the truthmaker for <TA through TF make true <All official copies of the inter-
national kilogram prototype are located in France>>? it’s against the spirit of 
truthmaker theory to take it as a brute truth, and it’s not assimilable to the case 
of negative existentials. if the truthmaker turns out to be a necessitator such as 
an absence or totality (i.e., it’s the absence of any further instances that makes TA 
through TF responsible in this case), then no advantage is gained over the neces-
sitarian. if the truthmaker is some further entity distinct from TA through TF, a 
regress is generated that requires infinitely more distinct objects to account for 
the relevant higher- order claims. And, finally, the collection of TA through TF is 
an inappropriate truthmaker for <TA through TF make true <All official copies of 
the international kilogram prototype are located in France >>. it’s nothing about 
TA through TF that accounts for why they are the truthmaker for the generaliza-
tion. Those six objects are truthmakers in the actual world only because nothing 
besides A through F is an instance of the generalization. But TA through TF have 
no bearing on the issue of whether or not there are other instances of the univer-
sal; TA through TF ground no fact about how many total instances there are. The 
existence of TA through TF, in other words, is completely independent of the ex-
istence of any other possible instances. yet TA through TF’s being the truthmakers 
in the actual world crucially relies on there being no other instances. since TA 
through TF have absolutely no ‘say’ regarding those other instances (in a neces-
sitating way or not), they have absolutely no say in whether or not they make 
true the generalization.
i maintain, then, that necessitarians enjoy a very strong advantage over 
non- necessitarians. The supposed ontological virtues of the latter view disap-
pear upon closer inspection, when we take into account the grounds for the facts 
about truthmaking. The necessitarian enjoys a theoretically simple account of 
higher- order facts about truthmaking; non- necessitarians face significant chal-
lenges, regardless of how they spell out the grounds for their contingent truth-
making facts.
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